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Abstract
Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic point of view.
Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC’03] many variants have been intro-
duced. However, almost all versions have the drawback that edges are treated uniformly,
i.e. every edge has the same cost and that this common parameter heavily influences the
outcomes and the analysis of these games.
We propose and analyze simple and natural parameter-free network creation games with
non-uniform edge cost. Our models are inspired by social networks where the cost of forming
a link is proportional to the popularity of the targeted node. Besides results on the com-
plexity of computing a best response and on various properties of the sequential versions,
we show that the most general version of our model has constant Price of Anarchy. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first proof of a constant Price of Anarchy for any network
creation game.
1 Introduction
Complex networks from the Internet to various (online) social networks have a huge impact on
our lives and it is thus an important research challenge to understand these networks and the
forces that shape them. The emergence of the Internet was one of the driving forces behind
the rise of Algorithmic Game Theory [27] and it has also kindled the interdisciplinary field
of Network Science [7], which is devoted to analyzing and understanding real-world networks.
Game-theoretic models for network creation lie in the intersection of both research directions
and yield interesting insights into the structure and evolution of complex networks. In these
models, agents are associated to nodes of a network and choose their neighbors selfishly to
minimize their cost. Many such models have been proposed, most prominently the models of
Jackson & Wolinsky [17], Bala & Goyal [6] and Fabrikant et al. [15], but almost all of them treat
edges equally, that is, they assume a fixed price for establishing any edge which is considered
as a parameter of these games. This yields very simple models but has severe influence on the
obtained equilibria and their properties.
We take a radical departure from this assumption by proposing and analyzing a variant of
the Network Creation Game [15] in which the edges have non-uniform cost which solely depends
on the structure of the network. In particular, the cost of an edge between agent u and v which
is bought by agent u is proportional to v’s degree in the network, i.e. edge costs are proportional
to the degree of the other endpoint involved in the edge. Thus, we introduce individual prices
for edges and at the same time we obtain a simple model which is parameter-free.
Our model is inspired by social networks in which the nodes usually have very different
levels of popularity which is proportional to their degree. In such networks connecting to a
celebrity usually is expensive. Hence, we assume that establishing a link to a popular high
degree node has higher cost than connecting to an unimportant low degree node. Moreover, in
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social networks links are formed mostly locally, e.g. between agents with a common neighbor,
and it rarely happens that links are removed, on the contrary, such networks tend to get denser
over time [21]. This motivates two other extensions of our model which consider locality and
edge additions only.
1.1 Model and Notation
Throughout the paper we will consider unweighted undirected networks G = (V,E), where V
is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges of G. Since edges are unweighted, the distance
dG(u, v) between two nodes u, v in G is the number of edges on a shortest path between u and
v. For a given node u in a network G let Nk(u) be the set of nodes which are at distance at
most k from node u in G and let Bk(u) be the set of nodes which are at exactly distance k from
node u (the distance-k ball around u). We denote the diameter of a network G by D(G), the
degree of node u in G, which is the number of edges incident to u, by degG(u). We will omit
the reference to G whenever it is clear from the context.
We investigate a natural variant of the well-known Network Creation Game (NCG) by
Fabrikant et al. [15] which we call the degree price network creation game (degNCG). In a NCG
the selfish agents correspond to nodes in a network and the strategies of all agents determine
which edges are present. In particular, the strategy Su of an agent u is any subset of V , where
v ∈ Su corresponds to agent u owning the undirected edge {u, v}. For v ∈ Su we will say that
agent u buys the edge {u, v}. Any strategy vector s which specifies a strategy for each agent
then induces the network G(s), where
G(s) =
(
V,
⋃
u∈V
⋃
v∈Su
{u, v}
)
.
Here we assume that G(s) does not contain multi-edges, which implies that every edge has
exactly one owner. Since edge-ownership is costly (see below) this assumption trivially holds in
any equilibrium network. Moreover, any network G together with an ownership function, which
assigns a unique owner for every edge, determines the corresponding strategy vector. Hence,
we use strategy vectors and networks interchangeably and we assume that the owner of every
edge is known. In our illustrations we indicate edge ownership by directing the edges away from
their owner. We will draw undirected edges if the ownership does not matter.
The cost function of agent u in network G(s) consists of the sum of edge costs for all edges
owned by agent u and the distance cost, which is defined as the sum of the distances to all
other nodes in the network if it is connected and ∞ otherwise. The main novel feature which
distinguishes the degNCG from the NCG is that each edge has an individual price which is
proportional to the degree of the endpoint which is not the owner. That is, if agent u buys the
edge {u, v} then u’s cost for this edge is proportional to node v’s degree. For simplicity we will
mostly consider the case where the price of edge {u, v} for agent u is exactly v’s degree without
counting edge {u, v}. Thus the cost of agent u in network G(s) is
costu(G(s)) =
∑
v∈Su
(degG(s)(v)− 1) + distG(s)(u) .
Note that in contrast to the NCG our variant of the model does not depend on any parameter
and the rather unrealistic assumption that all edges have the same price is replaced with the
assumption that buying edges to well-connected nodes is more expensive than connecting to
low degree nodes.
Given any network G(s), where agent u has chosen strategy Su. We say that Su is a best
response strategy of agent u, if Su minimizes agent u’s cost, given that the strategies of all other
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agents are fixed. We say that a network G(s) is in pure Nash equilibrium (NE), if no agent can
strictly decrease her cost by unilaterally replacing her current strategy with some other strategy.
That is, a network G(s) is in NE if all agents play a best response strategy.
Observe that in the degNCG we assume that agents can buy edges to every node in the
network. Especially in modeling large social networks, this assumption seems unrealistic. To
address this, we also consider a restricted version of the model which includes locality, i.e.
where only edges to nodes in distance at most k, for some fixed k ≥ 2, may be bought. We call
this version the k-local degNCG (degkNCG) and its pure Nash equilibria are called k-local NE
(kNE). We will mostly consider the case strongest version where k = 2.
We measure the quality of a network G(s) by its social cost, which is simply the sum over
all agents’ costs, i.e. cost(G(s)) =
∑
u∈V costu(G(s)). Let worstn and bestn denote the social
cost of a (k)NE network on n nodes which has the highest and lowest social cost, respectively.
Moreover, let optn be the minimum social cost of any network on n nodes. We measure the
deterioration due to selfishness by the Price of Anarchy (PoA) which is the maximum over all
n of the ratio worstnoptn
. Moreover, the more optimistic Price of Stability (PoS) is the maximum
over all n of the ratio bestnoptn
.
The use case of modeling social networks indicates another interesting version of the deg-
NCG, which we call the degree price add-only game (degAOG) and its k-local version degkAOG.
In these games, agents can only add edges to the network whereas removing edges is impossible.
This mirrors social networks where an edge means that both agents know each other.
1.2 Related Work
Our model is a variant of the well-known Network Creation Game (NCG) proposed by Fabrikant
et al. [15]. The main difference to our model is that in [15] it is assumed that every edge has
price α > 0, where α is some fixed parameter of the game. This parameter heavily influences
the game, e.g. the structure of the equilibrium networks changes from a clique for very low
α to trees for high α. For different regimes of α different proof techniques yield a constant
PoA [15, 1, 13, 24, 22, 16] but it is still open whether the PoA is constant for all α. In particular,
constant upper bounds on the PoA are known for α < n1−ε, for any fixed ε > 1logn [13], and if
α > 65n [22]. The best general upper bound is 2O
√
logn [13]. The dynamics of the NCG have
been studied in [18] where it was shown that there cannot exist a generalized ordinal potential
function for the NCG. Also the complexity of computing a best response has been studied and
its NP-hardness was shown in [15]. If agents resort to simple strategy changes then computing a
best response can trivially be done in polynomial time and the obtained equilibria approximate
Nash equilibria well [20].
Removing the parameter α by restricting the agents to edge swaps was proposed and an-
alyzed in [25, 3]. The obtained results are similar, e.g. the best known upper bound on the
PoA is 2O
√
logn, there cannot exist a potential function [19] and computing a best response is
NP-hard. However, allowing only swaps leads to the unnatural effects that the number of edges
cannot change and that the sequential version heavily depends on the initial network.
Several versions for augmenting the NCG with locality have been proposed and analyzed
recently. It was shown that the PoA may deteriorate heavily if agents only know their local
neighborhood or only a shortest path tree of the network [8, 9]. In contrast, a global view with
a restriction to only local edge-purchases yields only a moderate increase of the PoA [11].
The idea of having nodes with different popularity was also discussed in the so called celebrity
games [4, 5]. There, nodes have a given popularity and agents buy fixed-price edges to get highly
popular nodes within some given distance bound. Hence, this model differs heavily from our
model.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two related papers which analyze a variant of
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the NCG with non-uniform edge price. In [12] agents can buy edges of different quality which
corresponds to their length and the edge price depends on the edge quality. Distances are then
measured in the induced weighted network. Closer to our model is [23] where heterogeneous
agents, important and unimportant ones, are considered and both classes of agents have different
edge costs. Here, links are formed with bilateral agreement [17, 10] and important nodes have
a higher weight, which increases their attractiveness.
1.3 Our Contribution
We introduce and analyze the first parameter-free variants of Network Creation Games [15]
which incorporate non-uniform edge cost. In almost all known versions the outcomes of the
games and their analysis heavily depend on the edge cost parameter α. We depart from this
by assuming that the cost of an edge solely depends on structural properties of the network, in
particular, on the degree of the endpoint to which the edge is bought. Essentially, our models
incorporate that the cost of an edge is proportional to the popularity of the node to which it
connects. This appears to be a realistic feature, e.g. for modeling social networks.
On the first glance, introducing non-uniform edge cost seems to be detrimental to the analysis
of the model. However, in contrast to this, we give a simple proof that the PoA of the degNCG
is actually constant. To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first version of the NCG for
which this strong statement could be established. A constant PoA is widely conjectured for the
original NCG [15] but its proof is despite serious efforts of the community still an open question.
Besides this strongest possible bound on the PoA, which we also generalize to arbitrary linear
functions of a node’s degree and to the 4-local version, we prove a PoA upper bound of O(√n)
for the deg2NCG, where agents are restricted to act within their 2-neighborhood and we show
for this version that computing a best response strategy is NP-hard. Moreover, we investigate
the dynamic properties of the deg(2)NCG and prove that improving response dynamics may not
converge to an equilibrium, that is, there cannot exist a generalized ordinal potential function.
We contrast these negative convergence results by analyzing a version where agents can
only add edges, i.e. the deg(2)AOG, where convergence of the sequential version is trivially
guaranteed, and by analyzing the speed of convergence for different agent activation schemes.
The restriction to only edge additions has severe impact on the PoA, yielding a Θ(n) bound,
but we show that the impact on the social cost is low, if round-robin dynamics starting from a
path are considered, where agents buy their best possible single edge in each step.
2 Hardness
In this section we investigate the computational hardness of computing a cost minimizing strat-
egy, i.e. a best response, in the deg2NCG and in the deg2AOG.
Lemma 1. [2] Dominating Set in q-regular graphs is NP-hard.
To prove the NP-hardness of computing a best response in the deg2AOG and the deg2NCG
we first define a variant of Set Cover [14], called Exact-q Set Cover and prove that it
is NP-hard via a reduction from Dominating Set in q-regular graphs. The Exact-q Set
Cover problem is defined as follows: Given a universal set U = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a collection
of sets A = {A1, · · ·A`} where ∀Ai ∈ A, Ai ⊆ U and |Ai| = q with q ≥ 4; the task is to find the
minimum subset of A which covers U .
Lemma 2. Exact-q Set Cover is NP-hard.
Proof. We give a polynomial time reduction from Dominating Set in q-regular graphs to
Exact-(q+1)-Set Cover. Given a q-regular graph G = (V,E) with V = {1, · · · , n}, construct
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an instance of Exact-(q+ 1)-Set Cover as follows: The universe is U = V and the collection
of sets is A = {A1, · · ·An} such that Ai consists of vertex i and the vertices adjacent to vertex i.
Since G is q-regular, we have that |Ai| = q+1. Now S is an optimal solution for Exact-(q+1)-
Set Cover for the instance (U,A) if and only if R = {i | Ai ∈ S} is a minimum dominating
set for the graph G.
We now use the NP-hardness of Exact-q Set Cover to prove that the problem of computing
a best response in the deg2NCG and in the deg2AOG is NP-hard.
Theorem 1.
Computing the best response in the deg2NCG and the deg2AOG is NP-hard.
Proof. We prove the theorem by giving a polynomial time reduction from the NP-hard Exact-q
Set Cover problem to the problem of computing a best response of an agent u in an instance
of the deg2NCG. Consider an instance I of the Exact-q Set Cover problem with universal
set U = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a collection of sets A = {A1, · · ·A`}, where Ai ⊆ U for all Ai ∈ A and
|Ai| = q. We create a corresponding instance of the best response problem in the deg2NCG,
where the network G = (V,E) is defined as follows:
V = {v1, · · · , vn} ∪
{
p11, . . . , p
q+1
1 , . . . , p
1
n . . . p
q+1
n
}
∪ {a1, · · · , a`} ∪ {x} ∪ {u},
where each vi corresponds to i ∈ U and each ai corresponds to Ai ∈ A. The edge set E is
defined as follows:
E = {{vi, aj} | i ∈ Aj} ∪ {{vi, pri } | i ∈ U and 1 ≤ r ≤ q + 1}
∪ {{aj , x} | aj ∈ V } ∪ {{u, x}} .
Moreover, we assume that the edge {u, x} is owned by agent x. See Fig. 1.
u x
p11
v1 vn
ala1
pq+11 p
1
n p
q+1
n
Figure 1: Illustration of the construction used in the reduction.
Note that the degree of every node in B2(u) is exactly q+1 and in B3(u) at least q+2. Now we
observe that if agent u is playing her best response this means agent u has to create a minimum
number of edges to nodes in B2(u) such that every node vi is in distance 2 from u. This is
true since otherwise there exists a node aj ∈ B2(u) to which buying an edge costs q + 1 and
the resulting improvement in distance cost is at least q + 3 which contradicts the fact that u
is playing her best response. Moreover, since u does not own any edges, no deletions or edge
swaps are possible.
Let S∗u ⊆ B2(u) denote agent u’s best response. Since S∗u has minimum size such that all vi
nodes are in distance 2 to agent u, the union of the sets Aj ∈ A corresponding to the chosen
nodes aj ∈ S∗u forms the minimum size solution for the Exact-q Set Cover instance I.
Since in the above reduction the best response of agent u consists of only buying edges, this
implies NP-hardness for the deg2AOG.
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3 Analysis of Equilibria
We start with the most fundamental statement about equilibria which is their existence. We
use the center sponsored spanning star Sn, see Fig. 2(a), for the proof and provide some other
examples of NE and 2NE networks in Fig. 2.
Theorem 2. The star Sn is a (k)NE for the deg(k)NCG and the deg(k)AOG for any k.
Proof. In the center sponsored spanning star Sn the center agent cannot delete or swap any edge
since this would disconnect the network. Since the center already has bought the maximum
number of edges, no edge purchases are possible. Moreover, no leaf agent can profit from buying
any number of edges because only edges to other leaves can be bought, which is a 2-local move.
Such edges have cost of at 1 which equals the maximum possible distance improvement. Thus
no agent has an improving move for any k which implies that Sn is in (k)NE.
(a) The NE net-
work Sn
(b) A NE in the de-
gAOG/degNCG with
D = 3.
(c) A 2NE in the deg2NCG
with D = 4.
(d) A 2NE in the deg2AOG with
D = 5.
Figure 2: Examples of NE and 2NE networks
3.1 Bounding the Diameter of Equilibrium Networks
We investigate the diameter of (2)NE networks. Analogously to the original NCG [15], bounding
the diameter plays an important role in bounding the PoA.
Theorem 3. Consider variants of the degAOG and the degNCG where the price of any edge
{u, v} bought by agent u is any linear function of v’s degree in G, that is, priceu({u, v}) =
β · degG(s)(v) + γ, where β, γ ∈ R. Then the diameter of any NE network in the degAOG and
the degNCG is constant.
Proof. We consider a NE network G = (V,E) and assume that the diameter D of G is at least
4. Then there exist nodes a, b ∈ V , such that dG(a, b) = D. Therefore, the distance cost of a
agent a in G is at least D+ |B1(b)|(D− 1) + |N2(a)|. Thus, if agent a buys the edge {a, b} then
this improves agent a’s distance cost by at least D − 1 + |B1(b)|(D − 3). Since the network G
is in NE, the distance cost improvement must be less than agent u’s cost for buying the edge
{a, b}:
D − 1 + |B1(b)|(D − 3) ≤ β · degG(b) + γ
⇐⇒ D − 1 + (D − 3) · degG(b) ≤ β · degG(b) + γ .
Solving for D under the assumption degG(b) ≥ 1 yields
D ≤ (β + 3)degG(b) + γ + 1
degG(b) + 1
< β + 3 +
γ + 1
degG(b) + 1
∈ O(1).
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Using β = 1 and γ = −1 yields the edge price for our version of the degNCG and the degAOG.
This, and the NE example in Fig. 2(b) yields the following:
Corollary 1. The diameter of any NE network in the degAOG and degNCG is at most 3 and
this upper bound is tight.
Since in the proof of Theorem 3 in the case of β = 1 and γ = −1 buying an edge to a node in
distance 4 suffices, we get the following statement.
Corollary 2. Any 4NE network has diameter at most 3.
Note that the examples in Fig. 2(c) and Fig. 2(d) show that the diameter in the 2-local version,
i.e. in the deg2NCG and the deg2AOG, can exceed 3. We prove a higher upper bound on the
diameter for the 2-local versions.
Theorem 4. The diameter of any 2NE network is in O(√n).
Proof. Consider a 2NE network G = (V,E) with |V | = n and let D denote its diameter.
Consider two nodes a, b ∈ V such that dG(a, b) = D and a shortest-path tree Ta = (V,Ea)
which is rooted at node a (see Fig. 3).
c
b
a
Tc
L0
L1
L2
LD−1
LD
LD−2
Figure 3: The shortest-path tree Ta. Dashed lines denote edges of G which are not in the tree,
i.e. the non-tree edges.
The height of Ta is D and there must be a subtree Tc which contains node b and which has
node c as root, where c is chosen such that dG(a, c) = 2 and c belongs to the path from a to b
in Ta. Since the height of Tc is D− 2 it follows that the number of nodes in Tc must be at least
D − 1. Let |Tx| denote the number of nodes in the subtree of Ta rooted at node x. Hence, we
have |Tc| ≥ D − 1.
Note that if agent a buys any edge {a, x} in network G then this improves a’s distance cost
by at least |Tx|. Since G is in 2NE, we know that buying the edge {a, c} is not an improving
move for agent a which implies that |Tc| is at most the cost of the edge {a, c} which is equal to
degG(c). Since |Tc| ≥ D − 1 it follows that degG(c) ≥ D − 1.
Let Li denote the set of nodes which are in distance i from the root a in the tree Ta. For
example L0 = {a}, c ∈ L2 and b ∈ LD. Thus, we have D−1 ≤ degG(c) ≤ |L1|+(|L2|−1)+ |L3|.
Analogously, since G is in 2NE, we have that no agent vi in layer Li on the c−b path in Ta can
decrease her cost by buying an edge to a node in layer Li+2 which is a neighbor of a neighbor in
Ta. With analogue reasoning as above we get D−(i−1) ≤ degG(vi) ≤ |Li−1|+(|Li|−1)+ |Li+1|.
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Note that not only agents from lower layers cannot improve by buying edges towards nodes
in upper layers but also agents from upper layers cannot improve by buying edges towards nodes
in lower layers. Thus we have
D − (i− 1) ≤ degG(vi) ≤ |Li−1|+ (|Li| − 1) + |Li+1|
and
D − (i− 1) ≤ degG(vD−i) ≤ |LD−i−1|+ (|LD−i| − 1) + |LD−i+1|
for any 2 ≤ i ≤ ⌊D2 ⌋− 1. Summing up all inequalities yields:
2
bD2 c−1∑
i=2
(
D − (i− 1)) ≤ 3( D∑
i=1
|Li| − (D − 1)
)
.
For the left side we have
3D2
4
− 4D − 3 <
(⌊
D
2
⌋
− 2
)(
2D + 1−
⌊
D
2
⌋)
= 2
bD2 c−1∑
i=2
(
D − (i− 1))
and the right side gives 3
(∑D
i=1 |Li| − (D − 1)
)
≤ 3n− 3D + 3, which yields
3D2
4
− 4D − 3 < 3n− 3D + 3⇒ D < 2
3
(
1 +
√
9n+ 19
) ∈ O(√n).
3.2 Price of Stability
For analyzing the Price of Stability, we have to investigate the network which has the minimum
possible social cost.
Lemma 3. The center sponsored spanning star Sn is an optimal solution of the deg(k)NCG
and the deg(k)AOG for any k.
Proof. Consider an optimal network G with m edges and n nodes. As G has to be connected
we have m ≥ n − 1. Now all the pairs which are not connected by an edge are in distance of
at least 2 and there are n(n − 1) − 2m many such pairs. Adding the remaining 2m pairs with
distance 1 yield distance cost of 2(n(n−1)−2m)+2m = 2n(n−1)−2m which is also the lower
bound on the distance cost of any graph. Since Sn has diameter 2 and all edges have costs of 0
because every leaf node has degree 1, the social cost of the center sponsored spanning star Sn
meets the above lower bound.
We have shown in the proof of Theorem 2 that the center sponsored spanning star Sn is in
(k)NE for any k. With Lemma 3 this yields the following for k ≥ 2.
Corollary 3. The Price of Stability of deg(k)NCG and the deg(k)AOG is 1.
3.3 Price of Anarchy
For investigating the quality of the equilibria of our games, we first adapt an important lemma
by Fabrikant et al. [15] to our setting.
Lemma 4. If a (k)NE network G in the deg(k)NCG has diameter D, then its social cost is at
most O(D) times the minimum possible social cost.
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Proof. The minimum possible social cost is at least n2− 1 ∈ Ω(n2), as the network is connected
and every pair of nodes is at least in distance 1. To bound the social cost of of the (k)NE G,
we bound the social distance cost and social edge cost separately. A trivial upper bound for the
social distance cost is n2D, since G has diameter D.
For bounding the social edge cost we first consider bridges of G, which are edges whose
removal will disconnect G. There are at most n− 1 bridges, so the total edge cost of all bridges
is at most ∆(n− 1) ∈ O(n2) with ∆ = maxv∈V degG(v). Now we will argue that the cost of all
non-bridges bought by any agent u is inO(nD), which implies that the total edge cost of all edges
is in O(n2D). This yields an upper bound on the social cost of O(n2D+ n2 + n2D) = O(n2D),
completing the proof.
Consider an agent u and fix agent u’s shortest path tree Tu, that is, we fix a shortest path
from u to all other nodes in G. Let {u, v} be any non-bridge edge bought by agent u. Let Rv
be the set of nodes w, where the shortest path from u to w in Tu contains the node v.
We first argue that the distance between u and v is at most 2D if agent u would remove
the edge {u, v}. Note that removing {u, v} cannot disconnect the network, since {u, v} is not a
bridge. Let {x,w} be the edge on some shortest path from u to v in G = (V,E \ {u, v}) where
x /∈ Rv and w ∈ Rv. As the diameter of G is D and since x /∈ Rv there must be a path of length
at most D between u and x in G = (V,E \ {u, v}). Moreover, there exists a path of length at
most D − 1 between v and w in G. This true since dG(u,w) ≤ D. Since x is a neighbor of w it
follows that the distance between every node z ∈ Rv and x is at most D. Thus removing the
edge {u, v} increases the diameter to at most 2D and agent u’s total distance cost by at most
2D|Rv|.
We know that G is in (k)NE in the deg(k)NCG. Hence, buying the edge {u, v} must be
profitable for agent u, that is, degG(v) − 1 ≤ 2D|Rv|. Let S(u) be the set of nodes to which
agent u bought a non-bridge edge. Summing up the inequalities for all nodes in S(u) yields∑
v∈S(u)
(degG(v)− 1) ≤ 2D
∑
v∈S(u)
|Rv| < 2nD,
where the last inequality holds since all sets Rv are disjoint. This implies that the total edge
cost in any (k)NE network G is at most 2n2D + ∆(n− 1), which concludes the proof.
From Corollary 1 and 2 we know that the diameter of any NE in the degNCG and in
the deg4NCG is at most 3. Also, from the Lemma 4 we know that the social cost of any
NE network G is at most O(D(G)) times the minimum possible social cost. This implies the
following statement.
Theorem 5. The Price of Anarchy of the degNCG and the deg4NCG is in O(1).
A straightforward adaptation of Lemma 4 together with Theorem 3 yields:
Corollary 4. The Price of Anarchy of variants of the degNCG where the price of any edge
{u, v} bought by agent u is linear in v’s degree in G, is constant.
Using Theorem 4 and Lemma 4 yields the following statement.
Corollary 5. The Price of Anarchy of the deg2NCG is in O(√n).
We conclude with analyzing the PoA in the deg(k)AOG. The upper bound is trivially in O(n),
the matching lower bound holds, since a clique is in (k)NE for the deg(k)AOG for any k.
Observation 6. The Price of Anarchy of deg(k)AOG is in Θ(n) for any k.
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Figure 4: Example of an improving response cycle for the deg(k)NCG.
4 Dynamics
In this section we consider the dynamic properties of the sequential version of the deg(k)NCG
and the deg(k)AOG. The sequential version corresponds to an iterative process, called improving
response dynamics (IRD), which starts with some initial strategy vector s and its corresponding
initial network G(s) and then agents are activated one at a time according to some activation
scheme, e.g. a random or adversarially chosen move order or round-robin activation, and active
agents are allowed to myopically update their current strategy. They will do so only if the
new strategy yields strictly less cost than their current strategy. For the deg(2)AOG we will
also consider the best single edge dynamics, which is a special case of the improving response
dynamics, in which active agents buy the best possible single edge, if this strictly decreases their
current cost.
The most important dynamic property of a game is the finite improvement property (FIP) [26],
which states that any sequence of improving moves must be finite. The seminal paper [26] estab-
lished that having the FIP is equivalent to being a generalized ordinal potential game. Thus,
games having the FIP are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium under improving move
dynamics.
4.1 Dynamics in the deg(k)NCG
We investigate the convergence properties of the deg(k)NCG and prove that the deg(k)NCG
may not converge under improving move dynamics.
Theorem 7. The deg(k)NCG does not have the FIP for any k > 1, which implies that these
games cannot have a generalized ordinal potential function.
Proof. We prove the statement by providing an improving response cycle, which is a cyclic
sequence of networks where neighboring networks differ only by the strategy of one agent and
this strategy change is an improving response for the respective agent. See Fig. 4. The improving
move cycle consists of six steps G1, . . . , G6 and the transition from step Gi to Gi+1 mod 6 is an
improving local move by some agent. Since all these improving moves are 2-local, this proves
the statement for both the degkNCG and the degNCG for any k > 1.
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In network G1 agent e has edge cost of 1 and distance cost of 23 which yields a total cost of
24. By buying the edge to node i and removing the edge to node h (e “swaps” her edge from h
to i), agent e can decrease her cost by 1 since her edge cost in G2 is 3 and her distance cost is
20.
In network G2 agent b has edge cost of 6 and distance cost of 14 which yields total cost of 20.
By buying the edge to node h and removing the edge to node i, agents b’s edges cost decreases
to 4 and her distance cost increases to 15, which yields a total decrease of 1.
In network G3 agent j has edge cost of 4 and distance cost of 19 giving total cost 23. By
performing the swap from i to h, agent j’s edge cost does not change but her distance cost
decreases by 1.
To complete the improving move cycle, note that except for the edge ownership of edge
{h, i}, network G4 is isomorphic to G1, network G5 is isomorphic to G2 and G6 is isomorphic
to G3. Since neither agent h nor agent i are part of the improving move cycle, this implies that
the described improving moves exist in these networks as well. That is, in network G4 agent e
swaps her edge from i back to h. In network G5 agent b swaps her edge from h back to i and
in network G6 agent j swaps her edge from h back to i.
Remark 1. The presented improving response cycle in Fig. 4 is not a best response cycle for
the deg(k)NCG since in network G3 agent j has a strictly better local move: Buying the edge to
agent h and swapping her edge from i to e.
4.2 Dynamics in the Add-Only Model
We consider dynamics in the deg(k)AOG. First of all, since agents can only add edges, the
deg(k)AOG trivially has the FIP, i.e. it is an ordinal potential game with the number of bought
edges serving as a generalized ordinal potential function.
Since convergence is guaranteed, we focus on investigating the speed of convergence and
the quality of the obtained networks. For the latter, Observation 6 yields a devastating result.
However, we contrast this for the deg2AOG by proving that if round-robin best single edge
dynamics starting on a path as initial network are used, then the social cost is actually close to
the best possible achievable social cost.
Theorem 8. Let Pn = {v1 · · · vn} be the path of length n, with v1 and vn as leaf nodes, as a
initial graph for the deg(k)AOG:
1. If in any step the active agent is chosen uniformly at random then IRD in the deg(k)AOG
converge in O(n3) steps in expectation.
2. If in any step the active agent and her improving response is chosen adversarially then
IRD in the deg(k)AOG converge in Θ(n2) steps.
3. If round-robin best single edge dynamics are used in the deg2AOG, the process converges
in at most O(n log n) steps to a network with diameter O(1).
Proof. 1. Consider the following procedure: At any time t ≥ 1 let Gt = (V,Et) be the graph
in the process where G0 = Pn, select a node v ∈ V uniformly at random. If v in Gt
has an improving move then v adds a profitable edge. Otherwise it does nothing and the
above step is repeated. Since the deg(k)AOG is an ordinal potential game, we have that
at any time t, if Gt is not in equilibrium, then there must be at least one agent having an
improving response, i.e. who can buy at least one edge.
Consider the stochastic process {Xt}t≥0, where Xt = |Et|. Now if the graph Gt is not
in equilibrium, then the probability Pr(Xt < Xt+1) ≥ 1n and Pr(Xt = Xt+1) = 1 −
Pr(Xt < Xt+1). This implies that the expected number of steps until an improving
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response is played in the process {Xt}t≥0 is dominated by the geometric random variable
G
(
1
n
)
. In the process {Xt}t≥0 the absorbing state corresponds to a (k)NE network. Since
n − 1 ≤ Xt ≤ n(n−1)2 , for any t, it follows that the expected number of steps needed to
reach a (k)NE is at most O(n3).
2. Consider the adversarial scheme in Algorithm 1 which is illustrated in Fig. 5. First we
prove that each addition of an edge induced by this scheme is an improving response.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Scheme for the deg(k)AOG
Require: undirected path Pn = (V,E) from v1 to vn
1: for i := 1 to dn2 e − 3 do
2: activate vi and add the edge {vi, vi+2} to E
3: for j = i− 1 to 1 do
4: activate vj and add the edge {vj , vi+2} to E
5: end for
6: end for
7: for i = dn2 e+ 1 to n− 2 do
8: activate vdn
2
e−1 and add the edge
{
vdn
2
e−1, vi
}
9: end for
10: activate vn and add the edge {vn, vn−2} to E
11: if the model under consideration is the deg2AOG then
12: go to line 20
13: end if
14: activate vdn
2
e and add the edge
{
vdn
2
e, vn−1
}
15: i := dn2 e+ 3
16: while i ≤ n− 5 do
17: activate vn−1 and add the edge {vn−1, vi} to E.
18: i := i+ 3.
19: end while
20: return Graph G = (V,E).
Consider line 1 to 6 of the algorithm. At each step of the loop the degree of any node is at
most dn2 e and the distance improves to at least dn2 e+ 1. Thus every edge addition in the
loop is an improving response for the activated node. Now in the next loop, line 7 to 9,
only node vdn
2
e is active and each of its additions is an improving response since all bought
edges have a cost of 2 and the distance cost improvement is n− i+1 ≥ 3. The edge added
in line 10 is an improving response as it costs 3 and the distance cost improvement is at
least n− 2.
Now after this step we note that the network is in 2NE. Indeed, any two nodes from
{v1, . . . , vn−2} are in distance at most 2 to each other and adding an edge to vn−1 or vn im-
proves the distance cost by only 1. Note that adding the edges {vn−1, vn−3},{vn−1, vdn
2
e−1},
{vn−1, vn−3} or {vn−1, vdn
2
e−1} still may be an improvement. But buying an edge to vdn
2
e−1
costs n− 3 and the distance cost improvement is at most n− 4. At the same time adding
(vn−1, vn−3) shortcuts the distance to the nodes vn−3 and vn−4, thus this move improves
the distance cost by 2 and has a cost of at least 3. Hence the graph is in 2NE after line 10.
Next, we prove that the remaining edge additions are improving responses in the degAOG.
In line 14 the added edge yields an improvement for the active agent since it costs 2 and
improves the distance to node vn−1 by 2 and to node vn by 1. In the next loop, line 16
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Example of an improving move sequence induced by Algorithm 1. (a) is an 2NE in
deg2AOG and (b) is (k)NE in deg(k)AOG, where k ≥ 3.
to 19, node vn−1 is active and it buys an edge to vdn
2
e+3 and every third node starting
from there. These additions are improving responses since the degree of each node vi is
3 and adding an edge to them improves vn−1’s distance to vi, vi−1 and vi−2 by 2, 1 and
1, respectively. After this step the diameter of the network is 3 and the degree of every
node, except vn, is at least 3, hence no agent can improve further, which implies that the
network is in (k)NE, where k ≥ 3 .
Note that already in the first loop, line 1 to 6, Θ(n2) many improving responses are played.
3. Let G = Pn. We call an edge from vi to vj if i < j a forward edge otherwise, if i > j, a
backward edge. We consider round-robin activation in the order v1, v2, . . . , vn.
Starting with v1, v2, . . . , vn−4 every agent vi can buy a forward edge to node vi+2 since
degG(vi+2) = 2 and the improvement in distance cost is n − (i + 1). Another possibility
for vi is to buy a backward edge to vi−3 then it improves her distance to every second
node in v1, . . . , vi−4 and to node vi−3 by 1, i.e. distance cost improvement is at most
i−2
2 . At the same time buying a backward edge to vi−4 costs 4 and improves the distance
cost by i − 4. Hence, buying a forward edge is the best single edge addition for vi if
n− (i+ 1)− 2 ≥ (i− 4)− 4. Thus the best single edge addition of agent vdn+5
2
e is an edge
to vdn−3
2
e.
Now agent vdn+5
2
e+1 can buy an edge to vdn+5
2
e+2, vdn+5
2
e−3, vdn+5
2
e−4 or to vdn+5
2
e−5. Ob-
serve that buying a backward edge to the node with the lowest possible index maximizes
the distance cost improvement. Adding the edge {vd n+52 e, vdn+52 e−5} costs 5 and it improves
the distance towards all nodes v1, . . . , vdn+5
2
e−5 by 1. This yields a higher improvement
than buying a forward edge since dn+52 e−4+1−5 ≥ n−(dn+52 e+1)−2⇐⇒ 2·dn+52 e ≥ n+5.
Thus, adding (vdn+7
2
e, vdn−3
2
e) is a best single edge purchase.
For nodes vdn+7
2
e and vdn+9
2
e adding an edge to the same node vdn−3
2
e saves dn−32 e+ 1 and
dn−32 e+ 2 in distance cost, respectively, and the edge cost is 5 and 6, respectively. For all
the other nodes with higher index buying an edge to node vdn−3
2
e saves dn−32 e+ 3+(x−2)
whereas edge costs are x + 4, where x is the number of nodes which already bought a
backward edge to vdn−3
2
e. Since buying to a node with larger index or buying a forward
edge is inferior, it follows that buying an edge to vdn−3
2
e is a best single edge purchase for
all agents with index larger than dn+52 e.
So node vdn−3
2
e becomes a high degree node with degG(vdn−3
2
e) = n−dn+52 e+1+4 = bn+52 c.
In the following we call nodes having a degree linear in n a high degree node. Consider the
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diameter of the network D(G) after the first round. The length of the shortest path from
v1 to vdn−3
2
e is halved by the forward edges and since every node between vdn+5
2
e and vn
buys an edge to vdn−3
2
e the longest shortest path between the nodes {vdn−3
2
e, . . . , vn} is 3
so D(G) decreases from n− 1 to dn+94 e.
In the next round the best single improving edge of the first nodes vi, where i ≤ dn−112 e
is an edge to vi+4, since every edge costs 4 and distance cost improvement is n− (i+ 3).
Buying a backward edge to vi−8 has cost 6 and improves the distance cost by i− 8 + 1.
Let the forward edge region of any round be the set of nodes which have a best single edge
purchase which buys a forward edge. In round k no node up to node vdn+2k+2
2
e will buy a
backward edge, except when the forward edge would connect to a high degree node, since
a forward edge from vi to vi+2k costs 2k and improves the distance cost by n− (i+ 2k−1)
while a backward edge from vi to vi−2k+1 costs 2k+ 2 and the distance cost improvement
is i−2k+1 + 1. It follows that the diameter of the forward edge region halves every round.
Now we consider the connection between high degree nodes during each round. In the
second round the first backward edge is bought by agent vdn−11
2
e, since buying a forward
edge to the high degree node vdn−3
2
e is clearly too expensive. When we are in round k a
new high degree node vi, with i ≥ dn+212 e − 3 · 2k+1 to which other nodes buy backward
edges will occur.
Since there are at most 2k nodes between the first node who starts to buy a backward edge
and the high degree node from the last round and to the next high degree nodes there are
at most 3 · 2k−1, 3 · 2k−2 etc. nodes which lie in-between, there can be at most O(log n)
high degree nodes. Consider the high degree node with lowest index in round k ≥ 2 and
consider the step where the high degree node with the next higher index is active. At
this point, all nodes between the two high degree nodes have bought a backward edge
to the high degree node with lowest index, which implies that the high degree node with
the second lowest index can buy a backward edge as well. Since not all nodes with lower
index than the high degree node with lowest index have bought a forward edge to the
high degree node with lowest index, it follows that the best single edge of the high degree
node with the second lowest index connects to the high degree node with lowest index.
Analogously, all high degree nodes with higher index will also buy an edge to the high
degree node with lowest index. Thus, all high degree nodes after any round will form a
clique. It follows that the distance of any node with higher index than the current high
degree node with lowest index to the latter node is at most 3.
Figure 6: A sketch of the graph G in round k. The forward edge region, where the best single
edge addition is to buy a forward edge, is shown in blue. The large nodes show the high degree
nodes and the red edges belong to the clique formed by the high degree nodes.
Since the diameter of the forward edge region halves in every round there can be at most
O(log n) rounds until the diameter of the network is in O(1). At this point all nodes
with lower index than the lowest index of the clique nodes can possibly buy an improving
forward edge to all clique nodes but no improving backward edge can be bought by any
agent. Thus, there can be O(log n) additional rounds and the total number of additional
edges is in O(n log n).
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In total the dynamics needed O(log n) rounds and O(n log n) best single edge improve-
ments are made.
We contrast the upper bounds by showing that convergence in O(n) many improving responses
is possible.
Theorem 9. Let Pn be the initial network then there exists a sequence of improving responses
which takes
1. n− 2 + n−73 steps to obtain a NE network in the degAOG;
2. n− 1 steps to obtain a 2NE network in the deg2AOG.
Proof. 1. Consider the path Pn = v1, · · · , vn. We activate v1 and sequentially buy the edges
{v1, vi} for each 3 ≤ i ≤ n − 2. Afterwards we activate vn−1 and sequentially buy the
edges {vn−1, vi+3} with 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 8. Each edge addition is an improving move since v1
pays 2 to improve the distance cost by at least 3 and vn pays 3 and improves her distance
cost by 4 to the nodes vi+2, vi+3 and vi+4. After that no edge addition is possible as each
edge costs at least 3 whereas the possible distance cost improvement is at most 3. Thus
the network is in NE after n− 2 + n−73 = Θ(n) many steps.
2. Consider the following activation scheme in which node v1 buys an edge to each node vi
where 3 ≤ i ≤ n − 2. Every single edge purchase is an improving response because the
edge cost is 2 and the distance cost improvement is at least 3. Next, we activate vn and
add the edge {vn, vn−2}. This is improving for vn, since the edge costs 3 and it decreases
the distance cost by n− 2.
All nodes {v1, . . . , vn−2} are in distance at most 2 towards each other, thus there are no
possible further improving edge additions between these agents. Buying an edge to vn−1
and vn costs 2 and 1, respectively, whereas the distance cost improvement is also 2 and
1, respectively. The nodes vn−1 and vn do not want to buy an edge to v1 as it costs
n − 3 and the distance cost improvement is n − 4 and there is no other local improving
response for both nodes as each node in their 2-neighborhood costs 3 and the distance
cost improvement is just 1. Therefore the network is in 2NE after n− 1 many steps.
Finally, we investigate the quality of the (2)NE networks which can be obtained by improving
move dynamics starting from the path Pn. For this, we introduce a measure which is similar
to the Price of Anarchy. Let G0 be any initial connected network and let Z(G0) be the set
of networks which can be obtained via improving response dynamics in the deg(2)AOG. Let
Best(G0) ∈ Z(G0) be the reachable network with minimum social cost among all networks in
Z(G0). We can now measure the quality of any network G ∈ Z(G0) by investigating the ratio
ρ(G,G0) =
cost(G)
cost(Best(G0))
.
Theorem 10.
1. Let G be any network in Z(G0) then ρ(G,G0) ∈ O(n).
2. There is a network G ∈ Z(Pn) for the deg(2)AOG with ρ(G,Pn) ∈ Θ(n).
3. Let G∗ be the network obtained by the round-robin best single edge dynamics in the
deg2AOG, then we have ρ(G∗, Pn) ∈ O(log n).
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Proof. 1. To give the upper-bound on ρ(G,G0) we give upper-bound on the social cost of G.
Let D be the diameter of G then the total distance cost of all agents is at most Dn2 ≤ n3.
The total edge cost of all agents is also is in O(n3). The social of Best(G0) is at least
n(n− 1), since the diameter of Best(G0) is at least 1. Hence, ρ(G,G0) ∈ O(n).
2. The upper-bound follows from (1). The matching lower bound follows from the example
network G given in the second part of the proof of Theorem 8. In G there are Θ(n2) many
edges which all have cost in Θ(n) which yields social cost in Θ(n3). Now consider the
activation scheme in the proof of Theorem 9. In the constructed equilibrium network G′
the total edge cost is in Θ(n). Thus the social cost of G′ is in Θ(n2), which is an upper
bound on the social cost of Best(Pn). Hence, the ρ(G,Pn) ∈ Ω(n).
3. We prove the upper bound on ρ(G∗, Pn) by giving the upper bound on the social cost of
G∗ and the lower bound on Best(Pn).
From the third part of Theorem 8 we know that the total number of edges and diameter
of G∗, is in O(n log n) and O(1), respectively. Since the diameter of the G∗ is in O(1) the
total distance cost can be upper bounded by O(n2). The total edge cost of G∗ is upper
bounded by O(n2 log n), since there are O(log n) many high degree nodes with degree
Θ(n) and almost all edges are bought towards these high degree nodes and thus each have
cost in Θ(n). Hence, G∗ has a social cost in O(n2 log n).
On the other hand, a trivial lower bound on the social cost of Best(Pn) is n(n− 1), which
then yields ρ(G∗, Pn) ∈ O(log n).
5 Conclusion
We have introduced natural variants of the well-known NCG by Fabrikant et al. [15], which
have the distinctive features that they are parameter-free and at the same time incorporate
non-uniform edge costs. Besides proving that computing a best response is NP-hard and that
improving response dynamics may never converge to an equilibrium, we have also established
that the degNCG has a constant Price of Anarchy. This strong statement holds whenever
the edge price is any linear function of the degree of the non-owner endpoint of the edge or
if agents are allowed to buy edges to nodes in their 4-neighborhood. For the version which
includes stronger locality, i.e. the deg2NCG, we have shown that the PoA is in O(√n) and, as a
contrast, for the add-only version the PoA is in Θ(n). We also demonstrate how to circumvent
the latter negative result by using suitable activation schemes on a sparse initial network.
Studying the bilateral version of our model, where both endpoints of the edge have to agree
and pay proportionally to the degree of the other endpoint for establishing an edge, is an obvious
future research direction. For this version, we have already established that most of our proofs
can be easily adapted, which implies that our results, with minor modifications, still hold.
Another interesting extension would be to consider an edge price function which depends on the
degree of both involved nodes. This could be set up such that edges between nodes of similar
degree are cheap and edges become expensive when the degree of both nodes differs greatly.
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